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The right to a fair trial can only be fully guaranteed if the accused is able to follow and under-
stand the written and oral parts of the proceedings. Thus, the right to an interpreter and transla-
tion, in cases where the accused’s competency of the court language is not sufficient, is absolute 
central to the right to a fair trial. Indeed, as the Appeal Chamber states, it is the sine qua non of 
the trial, even if the accused is legally represented. This is especially true for the ICC which, 
unlike criminal courts in many civil law countries, does not allow for a trial in absentia. Con-
sidering the complexity of the cases, it will often be difficult even for a native speaker to un-
derstand all aspects of the various substantive and procedural issues. To expect an accused to 
follow in a second or third language rather than their mother tongue, particularly in light of the 
gravity of the accusations, has to be the exception.  
It is, therefore, not surprising that the drafters of the ICCStatute, if not granting the right to 
choose an interpreter, at least set the language competency below which such request should be 
granted, at a level higher than in other international legal instruments. The Appeal Chamber 
was therefore right to require a very high standard of language competency. 
Considering the importance and centrality of this right, it is astonishing that the Pre-trial Cham-
ber initially rejected the request. Even if there was good evidence that Germain Katanga had a 
sound knowledge of French, one has to ask whether he would have asked for an interpreter if 
he had not genuinely believed that he needed one. The only possible explanation for an unnec-
essary request would be intention to abuse the procedure, of which there was no indication in 
this case. Furthermore, the extent of the ability to understand and speak a language is very 
difficult to determine objectively and, as the Appeal Chamber stated, the accused is in the best 
position to evaluate his own language competency. If the accused strongly feels that he does 
not have a full understanding of the language, it is questionable as to whether a fair trial could 
be guaranteed, even if the chamber did not agree with this evaluation. Therefore it is to be 
welcomed that the Appeal Chamber clarified that, if there is doubt about the accused’s language 
competency, the court should decide in the accused’s favour. 
The Appeal Chamber went too far, however, in setting out a negative three-tiered test, according 
to which a request should be granted, unless it is absolutely clear on the record that; 
1) the person fully understands  
2) and speaks one of the working languages of the court  
 
 
3) and is abusing his or her right under Article 67 of the Statute.1 
There is no legal basis in the ICC Statute for this “good faith” requirement of absence of abuse. 
The Appeal Chamber relied instead on a footnote of the Working Group on Procedural Matters, 
which had not been incorporated in the final text. Likewise, the proposal to include a right to 
free interpreting in the ICC Statute had been rejected at the Rome conference. According to 
Articles 67(1)(a) and (f), it is the court who has to determine whether the accused’s language 
capabilities are sufficient to secure their right to a fair trial. Even though the accused should be 
given the benefit of doubt, they do not have a right to request this service, whether there is 
suspicion of abuse or not. It seems that the Appeal Chamber has given too much consideration 
to the fact that these proposals were made, rather than to the fact they have later been rejected. 
Furthermore, it is debatable whether such an additional good faith element is preferable. It as-
sumes that there might be cases where the accused’s competency is not sufficient, but because 
the accused is not acting in good faith, their request should not be granted. On the one hand, it 
is difficult to imagine a case where abuse of this right can be proven, as long as the accused 
claims he does not feel sufficiently competent in the language in question. Furthermore, the 
only possible scenario of abuse is where the accused makes such a request in order to cause 
extra cost, and more likely, further delay. Considering, however, the importance of the right to 
interpretation, it has to be asked whether the ICC could reject such a request where the accused 
falls below the required language competency, even if abuse of procedure is suspected. The 
accused who tries to abuse his defendant’s rights still needs to be granted all essential proce-
dural safeguards.  
By the time the case was referred back to the Pre-Trial Chamber, the Single Judge had no real 
choice but to grant the request, without any further thorough determination of the language 
capacity of the accused. A new examination of the evidence would have risked depriving Ka-
tanga and the co-accused, Mathieu Ngudjolo Chiu, of their right according to Article 61(1) ICC 
Statute to have the confirmation hearing held within a reasonable period after their surrender to 
the court. As a result, eight months after his initial appearance, in which Katanga explained “I 
do not speak French fluently, and sometimes it is difficult for me to understand and […] difficult 
for me to express myself”, it was finally decided that the provisional facilities for interpreting 
into Lingala would be maintained until the end of the proceedings. The question of interpreting 
from French into Lingala proved to be a long and costly procedure, which could have been 
avoided if the Pre-Trial Chamber had given more weight to the fact that this right is one of the 
cornerstones of any trial that takes place in a foreign country. Nevertheless, the clarification of 
the definition of the required standard of the Appeal Chamber is welcome, as this question is 
likely to be relevant in many future cases.  
In an interesting postscript, on 26 September 2011 the Registrar issued an observation to the 
court and voiced her “total surprise” after the defence had confirmed via email on 22 September 
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2011 that Katanga would testify in French after all.2 She expressed her dismay about the re-
source implications of providing interpretation services into Lingala. The difficult and lengthy 
recruitment and training process of the interpreters brought the costs for interpretation for Ka-
tanga to a total amount of €750,000, which seems in hindsight to justify the Pre-trial Chamber’s 
initial rejection of the request.  
In the end however, the defence is correct in asserting that “inconvenience arguments” should 
not play a role when the appellant’s fundamental rights are at stake. The Appeal Chamber there-
fore correctly reiterated the Pre-Trial Chamber’s prime responsibility of ensuring the accused’s 
procedural safeguards, rather than keeping the costs down. 
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